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Que no volveré, que no volverás
Que después de un Sol no te veré más
Dime que es mentira, que me lo soñé
Que tú ya no te vas
Que, a partir de hoy, todo es recordar
No te olvidaré, no me olvidarás
Dime que no es cierto
Y que este amor tan grande no se acabará
Hoy no me voy a dormir
Para que al reloj no le pasen las horas
Sonrisas por fuera aunque por dentro lloras
Yo voy a quedarme y tú te vas a ir (tú te vas a ir)
¿Qué más te puedo decir?
Si el primer amor durara para siempre
Sobrarán recuerdos, faltará tenerte
Dejas una historia en mí por escribir
Si yo te quiero, te quiero y te quiero
Y por tu culpa, febrero me duele de más
¿Dónde guardaré este amor si tú te vas?
Si no es mentira que te echo de menos
Si yo no te echo de menos, te extraño de más
Y aunque sé muy bien que tú no volverás
¿Cómo pretendo no echarte de menos si te amé de más?
Más te amo, menos tiempo, más te alejas, más lo siento
Restas tus ojos cafés, pero le sumas sufrimiento
Más besos imaginarios, más peleo en solitario
Yo estoy mal, pero te miento más de lo que es necesario
Cómo le explico a tu diario
Que yo ya me he acabado el abecedario
Por llorar canciones que te escribo a diario
Quererte más, imposible, soñarte es involuntario
Un amor que es irreversible
No lo borran ni los meses ni los años
Yo te extraño, te extraño con locura
Y no hay cura para esta historia de un amor extraordinario
Y que le siga un par de besos
Te quiero por dentro con cada hueso
Y, si tú me quieres, no me digas lo contrario
Pero lo que más me duele
Es quedar segundo si te vi primero
Entregarlo todo y quedarme con cero
Por sumarle aniversarios
A un amor que siempre será pasajero
Si yo te quiero, te quiero y te quiero
Y por tu culpa, febrero me duele de más
¿Dónde guardaré este amor si tú te vas?
Si no es mentira que te echo de menos
Si yo no te echo de menos, te extraño de más
Y aunque sé muy bien que tú no volverás
¿Cómo pretendo no echarte de menos si te amé de más?
No te has ido y ya te extraño de más
Yo no te olvidaré jamás
Yo no te olvidaré jamás
Tú júrame que volverás
No te has ido y ya te extraño de más
Yo no te olvidaré jamás
Yo no te olvidaré jamás
Tú júrame que volverás
Si yo te quiero, te quiero y te quiero
Y por tu culpa, febrero me duele de más
¿Dónde guardaré este amor si tú te vas?
Si no es mentira que te echo de menos
Si yo no te echo de menos, te extraño de más
Y aunque sé muy bien que tú no volverás
Y aunque yo sé que todas las historias tienen su final
Ya no me pidas que de ti me olvide, que no soy capaz
¿Cómo pretendo no echarte de menos si te amé de más?
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After conducting my own little investigation, I managed to find out that my uncle Aytan Baitelenov during the Second World War was drafted into the army on September 25, 1942 and, as part of various units, participated in many decisive military operations that were turning points during the Great Patriotic War – of the Zhizdrinsk offensive operation from February 22 to March 23, 1943, of the Oryol offensive operation from July 12 to August 5, 1943, of the Karachevo-Bryansk offensive operation from August 5 to September 15, 1943 and died on the last day of of the Nevelsko-Gorodok offensive operation , which went from December 13 to 26, 1943.
The division in which my uncle fought was part of the 110th Rifle Division until April 10, 1943, then was reorganized into the 84th Guards Rifle Division. At the time of formation, it was part of of the 33rd Army Western Front A , from 05/13/1943 in the 16th Army and the Western Front , as of 01.07.1943 in the 9000th Guards Army , 36th Guards Rifle Corps a of the Western Front , from 20.10.1943 years in the 11th Guards Army, 36th Guards Rifle Corps of the 2nd Baltic Front, from 11/18/1943 in the 11th Guards Army, 36th Guards Rifle Corps of the 1st Baltic Front.
Since November 11, 1942, the division was commanded by Major General Peters Georgy Borisovich. On 08/15/1943, the division was given the honorary name “Karachevskaya”, on 12/21/1943 it was awarded the Order of Suvorov, on 08/12/1944 it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Several thousand of its soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 7 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
From April 9, 1943 to March 1944, the 247th Guards Rifle Regiment, where my uncle Aitan served, was commanded by Guard Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Vasilenko.
Zhizdrinskaya operation February 22 – March 23, 1943 – offensive operation of the Soviet 16th Army of the Western Front against the 9th German Army of the Army Group “Center”, part of the winter-spring offensive of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front in the Great Patriotic War (in the Duminichsky, Lyudinovsky and Zhizdrinsky districts of the Kaluga region)
In February 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to conduct a series of offensive operations on the central sector of the Soviet-German front in order to build on the success achieved in the southern strategic direction and prevent the transfer of German forces there from the central sector of the front. These operations were the Maloarkhangelsk operation, the Sevsk operation, the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation and the Starorusskaya operation.
One of these operations was an operation near the town of Zhizdra, Kaluga Region. February 6 19For 43 years, the corresponding directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was signed, on February 9, the commander of the troops of the Western Front, Colonel-General I. S. Konev assigned to the commander of the 16th Army Lieutenant General I. Kh. Bagramyan the task of preparing the offensive . The army was supposed to advance in an 18-kilometer strip from the Zaprudnoe-Vysokoye region (southwest of the city of Sukhinichi) in the direction of Zhizdra, and then to the Bryansk region and, together with the troops of the Bryansk Front, encircle and capture Bryansk.
The army consisted of six rifle divisions, one rifle brigade, to develop success, the 9th tank corps and four tank brigades arrived in its lane (they were not included in the army). Initially, the disadvantage laid down in the operation plan was the performance of deep offensive tasks by the forces of one army, that is, in an isolated area with unsecured flanks (only to the north it was supposed to be supported by the neighboring 10th army of Major General V.
S. Popov with the forces of one division). Also, the deadline for preparing the operation turned out to be unrealistic – February 10, at the request of the army commander, it was extended. The army was significantly strengthened, but the transfer of a large number of troops turned out to be poorly organized by the front command and was opened by the enemy.
The command of the opposing German 9th Army (commanded by Colonel-General Walter Model) of Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal Hans Günther von Kluge) hastily reinforced its troops in the Zhizdra area with two infantry divisions, and also transferred anti-tank artillery and up to 100 tanks and assault guns. The already quite powerful defense line was additionally strengthened.
February 22, 1943 the Soviet troops went on the offensive. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, while continuously counterattacking wherever Soviet troops achieved success. His aviation was active. By February 24, it was only possible to squeeze the German troops out of the main defensive zone.
However, the rear defensive line following it was already completely occupied by German troops, who were ready for battle.
On February 26, stubborn battles began on it. Soviet troops succeeded in capturing a number of villages turned into fortified strongholds of defense, and by February 28 in places wedged into this defense zone up to 5-6 kilometers. In fact, it was almost broken through. However, by that time the army command had already committed all its rifle divisions to the battle, and therefore there were no means to turn the wedging into a breakthrough. The front commander I. S. Konev considered the success achieved insignificant and refused to commit 9th tank corps. The German command committed its 5th tank division and two infantry divisions, withdrawn from the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, into battle there. With these measures, he managed to stop the Soviet offensive. The offensive of the 16th Army was suspended to bring the troops into order. Its composition was replenished to 11 divisions, three rifle brigades and a separate ski regiment.
March 7, the 16th Army resumed the offensive. The army commander received the right to independently manage the actions of tank brigades and on the first day brought into battle all four tank brigades (a total of 110 tanks). During the day of the battle, the breakthrough of the rear defensive line was completed, the army advanced 5 kilometers, freeing five villages. Conditions were created for the fulfillment of the immediate task – the liberation of Zhizdra. However, by that time the decision of the Headquarters on the transfer to another front had already been received. 9th tank corps and there was nothing to develop success. The German command hastily took measures to localize the breakthrough and sent 3 more infantry divisions into battle. The Soviet offensive was again stopped.
After an operational pause, the third offensive attempt was made on March 19, 1943. The fighting was again marked by extreme ferocity. According to the Soviet side (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 28, 1943), from March 19 to March 23, in the Zhizdra area, German losses amounted to 140 tanks, 72 guns, 203 machine guns, 137 mortars and 8 thousand soldiers and officers killed.
But the Soviet offensive was repulsed, the enemy managed to recapture two of their strongholds lost in February. At the end of March, it became completely clear that in the central direction the enemy as a whole managed to repel the Soviet offensive: all Soviet offensives were stopped. The front commander ordered to go on the defensive.
As a result of a long and bloody operation, the Soviet troops advanced only 10-13 kilometers. The tasks of the offensive operation were not fulfilled. The reasons for the failure were mistakes at all levels, ranging from strategic (the actions of various Soviet fronts scattered over time in local and significantly distant sectors) to front-line (the moment of entering the battle tank strike grouping was missed, the actions of the 16th Army were not supported by the actions of other armies) and army (poor intelligence work, poor air support for troops, shortcomings in the interaction of artillery, tanks and infantry). Stalin positively assessed the actions of the army commander I.
Kh. Bagramyan in this operation (the army itself received the rank of guards and became known as the 11th guards army), placing the blame for the failure on the front commander. On February 27, I. S. Konev was removed from his post with the wording “as he had failed to manage the front troops” and recalled to Moscow, V. D. Sokolovsky was appointed commander of the front.
In Soviet historical science, a number of positive results of the operation are pointed out, which seem to be very controversial: the actions of the troops in other directions were facilitated (in fact, the Soviet troops did not achieve victory in any of the operations of the central sector of the front), the enemy suffered significant losses (losses of the Soviet troops turned out to be much larger).
The losses of the parties in this operation are unknown. On the Soviet side, they were very significant, especially given the extremely modest results of the offensive. So, in almost a month-long battles near one of the main battle centers – near the village of Kretovaya Gora – 1955 Soviet soldiers, near the village of Oslinsky – 2032 soldiers.
I. Kh. Baghramyan’s opinion on the operation “I must admit that already at that time I saw that the reason for the army’s failure to fulfill the assigned task was not only our omissions. Almost all offensive actions in the western direction in the spring of 1943 bore the imprint of haste and haste. At that time, all of us were still fresh in the brilliant victories of the Red Army achieved at Stalingrad, which marked the beginning of the mass expulsion of the fascist occupiers from Soviet soil. In that situation, it seemed to many that the morale of the enemy was broken, and if he was not allowed to come to his senses, to continuously strike in more and more new directions, then he would soon be completely crushed. Unfortunately, even some commanders of the fronts have such an erroneous belief and persistent desire to quickly achieve successes similar to the Stalingrad triumph. ”[1]
Literature Bagramyan I.Kh. So we went to Victory. – M .: Military Publishing, 1977. Chapter 3: “On the Western Front.
”
Bryansk offensive operation.
Hitler’s troops failed to take revenge near Kursk, where the battle went on from July 12 to mid-August 1943.
The victory at the Orel-Kursk Bulge opened the way for the Red Army to the Bryansk region, Belarus, Ukraine, the Dnieper. It was here in the autumn of forty-three that the center of military events moved.
The troops of the Bryansk Front, in close cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Western and right wing of the Central Fronts, defeated the German divisions near Bolkhov, Mtsensk and Orel. The Nazis fiercely resisted, but, despite this, our units moved forward. As a result of these battles, Karachev was liberated on August 15, the first regional center of the Bryansk region from the Orel side. The defeat of the Nazis in this direction, however, did not destroy their plans to stop the offensive of the Red Army at the turn of Velizh, Drogobuzh, Bryansk, Sumy, the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers.
An integral part of the general summer-autumn offensive of the Soviet troops in 1943 was the Bryansk offensive operation, carried out from September 1 to October 3, 1943 in order to capture a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Desna and the liberation of the Bryansk industrial region. After the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy, the troops of the Bryansk Front (50th, 3rd, 11A, 11th Guards (Lieutenant General I.Kh.Bagramyan) , 63rd Army, 15th Air Army approached defensive line prepared in advance by the enemy east of Bryansk and Navli.0011
The Bryansk Front was located at the junction of two main interacting groupings, and the success of strategically important operations in the western and southwestern directions largely depended on its actions.
The troops of the Bryansk Front, in close cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Western and right wing of the Central Fronts, defeated the German divisions near Bolkhov, Mtsensk and Orel.
The Nazis fiercely resisted, but, despite this, our units moved forward. As a result of these battles, on August 15, Karachev , the first regional center of the Bryansk region from the Orel side. In the battles for the liberation of Karachev, units of the 11th Guards Army took the main part. The defeat of the Nazis in this direction, however, did not destroy their plans to stop the advance of the Red Army.
Strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Front, carried out July 12 – August 18 (code name “Kutuzov”); part of the Battle of Kursk. The goal is the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy and the elimination of the Oryol ledge. In the Orel area, the troops of the 2nd tank and 9th field army of the Nazi German Army Group “Center” (37 divisions, including 8 tank and 2 motorized; about 600 thousand people, over 7 thousand guns and mortars, about 1200 tanks and assault guns, over 1100 aircraft, commander of the Oryol group, Colonel-General V.
Model). The enemy had a defense in depth with a developed system of field fortifications, engineering and minefields; many settlements were turned into centers of resistance. The following were involved in the Oryol operation: from the Western Front (Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky) – 50th, 11th Guards and 11th Army, 4th Tank Army, 2nd Guards Cavalry. building (since July 18), 1st air. army; all armies of the Bryansk Front (General – Colonel M. M. Popov) – 61st, 3rd and 63rd combined arms, 3rd Guards. tank (since July 14), 15th air; the main forces of the Central Front (General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky) – the 48th, 13th and 70th armies, the 2nd tank army, the 19th and 9th tank corps, the 16th air. army (a total of about 1.3 million people, over 21 thousand guns and mortars, 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 3 thousand aircraft). The plan of the Soviet command provided for attacks in converging directions on Orel from the north, east and south to dismember the enemy grouping and defeat it in parts.
On July 12, troops of the 11th Guards went on the offensive. Army and the Bryansk Front, July 13 – 50th Army. Within two days, Soviet troops penetrated the enemy defenses to a depth of 8-25 km; connections 11th Guards. Army (Lieutenant General I. Kh. Bagramyan) captured the enemy grouping in the Bolkhov region from the north-west and west and, moving south, endangered the enemy’s escape route from the Oryol ledge. The command of the fascist German troops, in order to prevent the defeat of their 2nd Panzer Army, transferred to its zone from the 9thth Army 4 tank and 1 motorized division. This facilitated the fulfillment of the task by the troops of the Central Front, whose armies on July 15 struck from the south and southeast in the general direction of Kromy. In an effort to hold the Orlovsky ledge, the enemy urgently transferred 7 divisions (including 3 tank divisions) here from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and launched a series of strong counterattacks, which were repelled.
To develop success on July 19, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was brought into battle in the Bryansk Front, and on July 20 and 26 in the Western Front – the 11th and 4th Tank Armies. In view of the fact that the enemy offered stubborn resistance to the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was transferred there, whose formations, by the end of July 27, having broken through the intermediate defensive positions of the enemy, advanced 35 – 40 km. The enemy began to withdraw his troops to the west in front of the left wing of the Bryansk Front and the right wing of the Central Front. Soviet troops defeated the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy and 29July liberated Bolkhov. Oryol was liberated on August 5, and Karachev on August 15. On August 17 – 18, Soviet troops, pursuing the enemy, approached the enemy defensive line “Hagen” on the outskirts of Bryansk. As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops advanced westward up to 150 km and defeated 15 enemy divisions.
The advance of the troops of the front was carried out with the active support of the partisans. Particularly distinguished in battles, 9 units and formations received the honorary titles “Orlovsky”, 4 – “Karachevskiye”.
On August 16, 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the Bryansk Front to continue the offensive and, no later than August 26-28, reach the Desna in the areas of Zhukovka, Bryansk and Trubchevsk, occupy the crossings and hold them firmly until the approach of the main forces. In the future, our troops were to force the Desna northwest and south of Bryansk, completely seize the Bryansk bridgehead and develop an offensive against Gomel. Hitler’s troops failed to take revenge near Kursk, where the battle went on from July 12 to mid-August 1943 years.
The victory at the Orel-Kursk Bulge opened the way for the Red Army to the Bryansk region, Belarus, Ukraine, the Dnieper. It was here in the autumn of forty-three that the center of military events moved.
The Bryansk offensive operation was also an integral part of the general summer-autumn offensive of the Soviet troops in 1943.
The troops of the Western Front acted to the right, and the troops of the Central Front to the left. By August 25, the troops of the Bryansk Front were operating on the ledge of Zhukovka, Bryansk, Trubchevsk on a strip of 150 km (50, 11 and 63 armies – the first echelon, 3rd army – the second echelon, 4th tank was put into reserve).
As of September 1, the Bryansk Front had 6,522 guns and mortars, not counting 45 mm guns, about 800 rocket launchers, 420 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition to the 4th tank army, the front had the first tank corps, 2 tank brigades, 3 heavy tank, 11 tank and 9 self-propelled artillery regiments. However, in many of them there was a significant shortage. Aviation support was supported by the 15th Air Army, where there were 802 serviceable aircraft.
Great hopes were placed in the Bryansk offensive operation on partisan detachments.
In front of the Bryansk Front from the village of Surovegina to Nerussa, for 200 km, the enemy concentrated a 9 field army – 16 divisions, each of them numbering 10 thousand people. In addition, the enemy managed to build quite strong fortifications along the banks of the Desna, Iput, Sudost rivers, and set up many concrete firing points.
The commander of the Bryansk Front, Colonel-General MM Popov, reported to the Headquarters that the main attack on enemy troops was planned to be delivered in the Dubrovka area, where, as he believed, the enemy was less prepared for resistance. As a result of this offensive, the Desna was forced, the settlements of Rekovichi and Zhukovka were liberated.
On August 26, the troops of the Central Front, operating to the south, dealt a powerful blow to the enemy’s Sevskaya grouping, broke through its defenses and advanced 20-25 km, liberating the city of Sevsk on August 27. The Nazis hastily retreated in the direction of Trubchevsk.
On the morning of September 1, the enemy was forced to leave their positions on the Nerussa River. The troops of the 63rd Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.Ya.Kolpakchi) went on a swift offensive and went deep into the fascist fortified area from 18 km on the right flank and 40 km on the left.
September 5 The 11th Guards Army (I. Kh. Bagramyan) broke through the enemy’s powerful defensive line covering the approaches to Bryansk and went on the offensive in the direction of Navli. On September 7, south of Bryansk, the 11th Guards Army captured the city and the Navlya railway junction and cut the Bryansk-Konotop, Bryansk-Lgov railways. The army came close to the partisan edge in the southern massif of the Bryansk forests. To help the advancing units of the Red Army, the partisans carried out several bold operations, in which 13 partisan brigades participated – more than 13,500 people.
The troops of the 63rd army were successfully moving forward.
The enemy offered little resistance, as there were forests around, where partisans haunted him. By the end of September 8, troops of the 63rd Army and 84 Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army cut the Bryansk-Khutor Mikhailovsky railway line. They came close to the partisan edge, where the southern operational group of partisans operated. On that day, partisan detachments fully connected with the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front. Fierce fighting continued in the areas of Dyatkovo, Bryansk and Bezhitsa. September 15 19For 43 years, the main forces of the 50th Army united with units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and, pursuing the enemy, reached the opposite bank of the Desna along the entire front line.
In the evening of September 16, the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was read on the radio, in which the courage and heroism of the soldiers of the corps of Major General Kryukov were noted during the crossing of the Desna. By this order, the corps commander and the commanders of the distinguished units were awarded the Orders of Suvorov.
The success of the offensive of the 50th Army and the 2nd Guards Corps made it possible for other troops to break through the enemy defenses and also go on the offensive. Pursuing the enemy, our units approached Bezhitsa and Bryansk. By the time our troops approached, the enemy had fortified the left bank of the Desna, created powerful defensive structures in Bryansk and Bezhitsa. Approaches to the river and possible areas for forcing it were mined and held under multi-layered fire of all types of weapons. Despite the fact that the Nazis put up a solid defense here, it was broken through. 84th Guards Rifle Division (Major General G.B. Peters), 4th Rifle Division (Colonel D.D. Vorobyov) 273rd Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Valyugin), using a roundabout maneuver, was released on the morning of September 17 city of Bezhitsu. Then, under the cover of artillery fire and aviation operations , the 11th Guards Army crossed the Desna south of Bryansk, and the 11th Army began to force the river in the area of the city itself and on September 17, 1943, by 9 o’clock in the morning they took the city of Bryansk.
The enemy hastily retreated to the west..
On the same day, Moscow saluted the valiant troops of the Bryansk Front with twelve artillery volleys of 124 guns.
During the month of hostilities, the troops of the Bryansk Front broke through the previously prepared and well-fortified German line “Hagen” and, advancing in the most difficult conditions through wooded and swampy terrain, crossed the rivers Bolva, Iput, Desna, Sudost, Besed, advanced westward by 200 -250 kilometers. As a result, the offensive on September 28 was completed by the liberation of the Bryansk region from the Nazi invaders.
Nevelsko-Gorodok offensive operation
Gorodok operation 1943 – an offensive operation of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan during the Great Patriotic War near the town of Gorodok, Vitebsk region from December 13 to December 31, 1943.
It was planned by counter strikes of the 11th Guards and the 4th shock armies in the direction of the Bychikha station to defeat the Gorodok grouping of the enemy, to eliminate the bridgehead, the so-called Gorodok ledge, formed at the final stage of the Nevelsk operation 1943g.
, capture Gorodok and continue the offensive in the direction of Vitebsk.
The alignment of forces was as follows. From the USSR side there was the 11th Guards Army, units of the 43rd Army, units of the 4th Shock Army, units of the 3rd Air Army, 1st Tank Corps, 5th Tank Corps, 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. From Germany, the 3rd Panzer Army of the Army Group Center, the troops of the southern wing of the 16th Army of the Army Group North, additionally deployed two infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and one tank division from the southern wing of the Army Group Center “.
December 13, 1943 The 11th Guards and the 4th Shock Army, with the support of tanks and artillery, broke through the enemy defense line. In the offensive zone of the 11th Guards , which delivered the main blow, the enemy put up stubborn resistance. On December 14, on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army , the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division were brought into action.